Assessing the risk of nuclear terrorism is a challenging task due to the diversity of actors involved, variety of pathways to success, range of defensive measures employed, and the lack of detailed historical record upon which to base a iii nalysis.
Introduction
The fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit, held in the United States in March 2016, capped six years of sustained international effort to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Over this period billions of dollars have been spent on a broad range of nuclear security initiatives. States have minimised their use of sensitive nuclear materials, in particular highly enriched uranium (HEU); increased the physical, information, and human security of nuclear and radiological facilities; developed and implemented new national nuclear security legislation; employed systems to detect nuclear material outside of regulatory control; and made preparations to mitigate the ultimate effects should an incident occur. 1 Given this level of investment, significant attention has also been directed at measuring the effectiveness of these efforts and whether they have indeed served to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. Here there are several approaches that can be taken. Narrowly focused assessments might, for example, measure security culture improvements within a specific organisation as a result of targeted education and 1 Sharon Squassoni, "Outcomes from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit," Centre for Strategic and Perhaps surprisingly, despite this clear disparity, the use of high-level numerical estimates of nuclear terrorism is widespread. They appear in public discourse, are referenced throughout the academic literature, and can be found in government testimony, thus influencing nuclear security decision-making at the highest levels.
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This paper discusses the challenge of assessing the risk of nuclear terrorism, highlighting the serious pitfalls that are, we feel, an inevitability when carrying out numerical analysis. Beginning by introducing the process of risk assessment, this paper outlines two broad interpretations of probability -the Frequentist and subjective Bayesian approaches -which can be used to produce numerical estimates of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. Three different categories of risk are then considered, with nuclear terrorism demonstrated to be a 'virtual risk' which defies straightforward quantification. Existing approaches to modelling the likelihood of nuclear terrorism are then critiqued, with a particular focus on event tree analysis, a common and straightforward modelling approach. Finally, alternative perspectives on the utility of risk modelling and the useful insights they can bring when considering nuclear terrorism are presented. Although widely applied, risk is an elusive concept with divergent interpretations across different fields making a precise definition difficult. In general terms, risks are associated with certain events or activities and incorporate three distinct notions:
Approaches to risk assessment
hazard, likelihood, and consequence. 6 A hazard exists as a source of danger; it is what can go wrong. Every hazard has a likelihood of occurring and, if indeed it does occur, a range of consequences will follow.
In essence, a risk analyst collects together a set of hazards, assigns likelihoods to their occurrence and then, assuming the events in question do occur, considers consequences attendant upon the range of possible occurrences. The "risk" associated with a given system is a function of likelihood and consequence for this collection of potential hazards. 7 When dealing with complex phenomena such as terrorist activity we use the alternative terminology scenario as opposed to hazard. While a terrorist group is clearly a hazard, this language emphasises the specific context under consideration, that is, the group together with a range of possible actions that could be undertaken. 6 Stanley Kaplan and B. John Garrick, "On the quantitative definition of risk," Risk Analysis, 1 (1981): 11-27. 7 Many potential hazards may fall outside the ambit of our collective knowledge resulting in so-called
Black Swan events, as discussed by Nassim Taleb in his book of the same name.
In the domain of nuclear terrorism a frequently discussed scenario is the terrorist acquisition of fissile material and subsequent fabrication of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). 8 For the purposes of risk analysis the details of such a scenario should be reasonably specific. For example, a group could purchase fissile material on the black market using contacts in Eastern Europe before shipping it to a safe haven in the Middle East through known drug trafficking routes. At a well-equipped facility a scientific team then engineers a crude nuclear device using specialist equipment and other materials that have been legitimately purchased on the open market. Finally, the group transports the IND to the target location, the capital city of a nearby country, and detonates the device.
Given this scenario, a risk analysis would consider the likelihood and consequences of terrorist success. Likelihood of success will depend upon a myriad factors including, but not limited to, the financial arrangements of the group, the availability of fissile material of sufficient quality and quantity on the black market, the intelligence and nuclear security arrangements of a number of countries, and the technical ability of the assembled scientists, engineers, and technicians to successfully build a viable nuclear device. The consequences of a successful attack are similarly diverse and include the potential collapse of local governments, strain on regional alliances, and economic turmoil, alongside the significant physical and psychological suffering caused by the blast, fire, and fallout generated by the detonation. This short example highlights some of complexities found in analysing the risk of nuclear terrorism and represents just one of the many possible scenarios that could reasonably be considered.
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When risk analysis is carried out numerically, relationships between a scenario, its likelihood, and its consequence must be specified. Commonly, analysts use the risk = likelihood x consequence equation, or similar. 10 Many quantitative studies concerning the risk of terrorism take this approach. 11 Quantified risk assessment relies on the determination of numerical values for likelihood -the probability of an event occurring, and its consequence -the relative severity of the event. As outlined above such scenarios do not lend themselves to easy quantification. This paper explores the challenges associated with assessing the likelihood of nuclear terrorist events in quantitative terms. Assessments of the consequences of an act of nuclear terrorism are not addressed here, although have been discussed elsewhere.
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Frequentist and Subjective Bayesian probability
When determining probabilities for events as part of a quantitative risk assessment, analysts generally adopt either the Frequentist or subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability. The former takes a "frequency view of probability" in which a large number of independent repetitions of an identical statistical experiment are conducted to form a sample dataset. Probabilities for each possible outcome are calculated by dividing the frequency of each outcome by the total number of events contained in the dataset. 13 The Frequentist approach to probability estimation can be illustrated using a simple example, the flipping of an unbiased coin, a process that has two possible outcomes, heads or tails. Suppose we wish to determine the probability that a coin flip will result in a head. Frequentist probability tells us that we must Frequentism," Erkenntnis, 45 (1996): 209-227 . Please note that our designation of Frequentist probability could, more properly, be referred to as finite Frequentist probability. This approach demonstrates a wide range of mathematical and philosophical problems as an interpretation of probability despite its numerous enticements conduct a large number of coin flips, measure the result each time, and calculate the share of heads and tails for different numbers of flips: 1 flip, 10 flips, 100 flips, etc. The results of such an experiment are given in Figure 1 . As the number of flips increases, the proportion of heads approaches 50 percent. Using this increasingly refined experimental data, the probability of a head resulting from the flip of an unbiased coin is determined to be 50 percent.
As illustrated by our simple example, a crucial issue in utilising Frequentist probability is sample size. From Figure 1 it is clear that results based on a single flip would be misleading. In general, the larger the sample size, the more confident one can be in using Frequentist probability (subject to certain caveats) 14 .
In risk analysis there is often a great deal of useful data available to aid in the evaluation of the likelihood of a scenario, which allows Frequentist probability to be utilised. For example, analysis of past road traffic accident data shows that young male drivers are disproportionately likely to be involved in accidents in the United Frequentist probability may change slightly year-to-year, the overall trend remains fundamentally the same. Consequently, young male drivers, who are a greater accident risk than other demographics, pay higher insurance premiums.
Frequentist probability is essentially the mathematical description of a sample dataset to draw inferences concerning the phenomenon under study. Following this approach any analyst provided with the same dataset and utilizing the same analytical tools would produce, in theory, identical results -in this sense, Frequentist probability may be thought of as objective. 16 The Frequentist approach contrasts with that adopted by subjective Bayesian probability which explicitly incorporates analyst subjectivity.
In general, there is no standardised process for generating subjective Bayesian probability judgements: they are based on the experience of the assessor and represent a degree of belief in the likelihood of occurrence of the event at hand. 17 In cases where information is limited and the Frequentist approach to probability cannot be usefully applied, as the data set is too small to be representative of the phenomenon under study, for example, subjective Bayesian approaches incorporating existence of a 'correct' (in the sense of universal) probability." 19 Instead, subjective probabilistic judgements need only be self-consistent i.e. obey the laws of probability.
(For instance, the probability across all possible outcomes of a particular event must sum to 100 percent.) As this form of probabilistic judgement relies on an investigator's knowledge and prior beliefs, an "individual making [a subjective Bayesian] assessment will be coherent but [we] cannot force consensus between two different analysts".
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Mathematically, Bayesian probability is a procedure for revising and updating probability estimates in light of new evidence. This requires the assessor to first specify their beliefs about an event in quantitative terms as a prior probability distribution.
Bayes Theorem is then applied to derive the posterior probability distribution taking into account new evidence or data conditioned on this prior. This mathematical theory "has two main elements: the use of the laws of probability as coherence constraints on rational degrees of belief…and the introduction of a rule of probabilistic inference" based on the revision of these rational degrees of belief using new data. 21 In this paper reference to the Bayesian approach to probability indicates to the former aspect of the theory -coherence constraints on rational degrees of belief. For clarity, from this point we designate this as the subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability. This is the approach adopted by the quantitative studies of nuclear terrorism that are considered later in this paper.
It must be noted that interpretations of probability are not neatly divided into objective and subjective camps. It is uncontroversial to note that subjectivity wends its way into many scientific activities perceived as being objective: readers with an interest in this are directed to Matthews' discussion on the subject which, in part, deals with subjectivity in Frequentist methods of statistical inference. Bayesian approach to probability can still enable quantitative probabilistic judgements to be made, albeit subject to certain limitations.
When seeking to analyse the risk associated with a rare or unique event for which data is either extremely limited or does not exist, the subjective Bayesian approach is often adopted. Analysts provide their own subjective Bayesian judgement concerning the probability of certain events. This analysis incorporates a wide range of data pertaining to similar but ultimately different situations. Probabilities for these similar events are estimated using a Frequentist approach and are used to create what Kaplan and
Garrick call a bureau of standards -an analyst's calibration scale against which a particular scenario can be compared. 26 Analysts use the bureau of standards as a guide when expressing a subjective Bayesian probability of occurrence for a given scenario.
However, there is no formal process for drawing upon the bureau of standards and, hence, the extent to which different bureau components affect probability judgements 25 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Subjective Probability: A Judgement of Representativeness," in referred to in this paper as the knowledge gap. 31 Note that, while normative and substantive goodness are concepts taken from an established literature, the term knowledge gap has been coined here for explanatory purposes. While there are intrinsic challenges in applying subjective Bayesian methods, they have been successfully utilised in many areas, for example, in designing risk prediction models for treating common diseases. 32 A simple description of the major differences 31 An alternative name for the knowledge gap could be epistemic goodness, the extent to which relevant knowledge about the hazard or scenario under consideration is knowable. between Frequentist and Bayesian approaches to probability estimation is summarised below in Table 1 .
Subjective Bayesian and Frequentist Approaches in Security Studies
Both subjective Bayesian and Frequentist approaches have been used to make predictions within the field of security studies. 
Nuclear terrorism as virtual risk
To date the malicious use of nuclear and radiological materials by non-state actors has been limited and there have been no large-scale incidences of nuclear terrorism. As a result it is not possible to adopt a Frequentist approach to risk estimation. When examining the likelihood of a major terrorist attack such as the detonation of an IND by a terrorist group, it is therefore necessary to consider the application of subjective Bayesian methods. However, as emphasised above, the validity of this approach for the scenario under consideration hinges upon the size of the knowledge gap. It must be possible for an analyst to construct a bureau of standards with high substantive goodness for the resulting probability judgements to be anything other than highly speculative. In exploring the extent of the knowledge gap for nuclear terrorism it is illustrative to draw on Adams' three kinds of risk typology wherein risks are categorised as directly perceptible, perceived through science, and virtual. A similar situation obtains in the security domain when forecasting risks arising from conventional terrorism. There exist substantial and complex datasets upon which quantitative analysis can be performed to make predictions and to inform riskminimising actions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, particularly in the distribution of resources for defensive systems. For example, the installation of metal detectors at airports has been shown to reduce instances of aircraft hijacking, although the overall effect of this policy is effectively neutral once substituted terrorist activities are taken into account. 42 While it may appear obvious that metal detection technology will decrease hijacking, a rigorous cost-benefit analysis is needed to determine whether such a preventive policy delivers sufficient risk-minimising value compared with alternatives. The authority and skills required to conduct such a study are beyond 41 In the United Kingdom, the response to mid-nineteenth century cholera epidemics followed precisely this pattern. Popularly attributed to the revolutionary statistical epidemiology of Dr John Snow, who painstakingly identified a contaminated communal water pump handle as the source of a central London outbreak, the realisation that cholera spread via the faecal-oral route forced the authorities to act. Legislative changes followed and regulations governing public health were disseminated by the General Board of Health that required local authorities to "provide dispensaries operating around the clock with sufficient medical aid to treat cholera patients" amongst other stipulations, see Estimates produced diverge to the point that a coherent picture regarding purported risks cannot be divined and "convictions, prejudices, and superstitions" form the basis for analysis.
activity about which it is difficult to generalise due to the diversity of states, facilities, measures, materials, and actors involved. This lack of sufficient detail limits the calibration of probability estimates regarding success or failure of potential adversaries.
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Nevertheless, attempts to deduce probabilities either directly from or referencing the historical record are not uncommon. A widely read study by Matthew Bunn illustrates these issues clearly while offering a nuanced understanding of the challenges facing analysts engaging in numerical assessment. Bunn assesses the probability of a terrorist group choosing to pursue black market acquisition of nuclear material as "fairly large", equating to around a 30% annual likelihood, and assigns the probability of a group being successful in an attempt at 20%. 51 Assessing terrorist intentions to carry out acts of nuclear terrorism is similarly challenging. While some analysts point to terrorist statements regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, others pass this off as empty rhetoric, arguing that the same groups will be deterred from acquiring and using such weapons for fear of alienating their political base, diminishing their meagre financial resources, and risking their long-term survival through reprisal action by the states they target. 53 These statements cannot be interpreted in an unambiguous manner and offer scant basis for numerical reasoning.
Efforts to Quantify the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
Despite intrinsic challenges in assessing the risk of nuclear terrorism a substantial literature has developed over the past two decades driven by the belief that "the danger of high-end terrorism is growing. annual likelihood of nuclear terrorism as "more likely than not" (i.e. upwards of one in two) and more than one in three billion, respectively.
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In modelling terrorism and, in particular, nuclear terrorism, event tree models have been widely utilised. This conceptually simple method has been applied to assess the reliability of nuclear reactors and is commonly used in the context of Probabilistic Safety Analysis or Probabilistic Risk Analysis for large engineering projects. 62 The development of probabilistic tools for risk analysis and their application to nuclear engineering has a long and complex history which has reflexively shaped nuclear safety, a process culminating in the famed 1975 WASH-1400 study. 63 When applied to terrorism, a group's behaviour is broken down into a sequence of actions or decisions, each of which has an associated probability. An initiating event, often the decision of a terrorist group to undertake an attack, is followed by all possible realisations of this decision point and all subsequent contributory decisions laid out in a sequence or tree. 64 Each tree ends at a terminal event; in the case of nuclear terrorism this could be the successful detonation of an IND. As "the probability of each event is displayed conditional on the occurrence of events that precede it in the tree, the joint probability of the intersection of events that constitute a sequence (or "scenario") is found by multiplication" along the sequence in question. 65 This is a trivial calculation which further supports the widespread application of event tree models by limiting their technical content. Event trees have been the subject of intense academic study and a growing literature concerning their construction and operation is now available and accessible to the lay reader.
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In the context of nuclear terrorism, an attack scenario is broken down into constituent sequential steps. These are then analysed from the perspective of the adversary, with the probability of a terrorist group completing each step considered in turn. 67 A subset of these steps might include an insider first defeating facility security systems to acquire nuclear material, bypassing detection systems to illicitly remove the material from the facility, and overcoming technical challenges to fabricate a viable device, before transporting the device to a target, and successfully detonating. The probability of this scenario occurring is determined by multiplying the probabilities of success of each sequential step along a given tree, from the initiator to the terminus. However, despite their conceptual and operational simplicity, there are serious problems with the way in which event-tree models have been applied to terrorism and, in particular, nuclear terrorism. These stem largely from the way they serve to simplify terrorist group's decision-making processes, failing to treat terrorists as intelligent and adaptive adversaries, with probabilities regarding group behaviour required as model inputs as opposed to outputs. These weaknesses are discussed in more detail below.
Terrorists are intelligent and adaptive
Event trees were designed to study large engineering projects incorporating many interdependent physical components. While this type of system may be complicated in structure, the relevant characteristics of individual components (for example, failure rates) can be readily described by static probability distributions and easily encoded into the relevant event tree branches. This is not the case when describing terrorist decision-making, which is a dynamic process wherein groups adapt their tactics and strategy in response to various external and internal stimuli, such as the introduction applies to each step of the nuclear terror process. When determining these probabilities, subject matter experts are currently required to predict how adversaries will behave a priori, providing such figures as model inputs. As emphasised by the US National Research Council in their report on the misapplication of event tree analysis in the bioterrorism domain, for this approach to be valid "the subject-matter experts must grasp nuances of alternatives and outcomes and render opinions founded on an analysis of the entire decision process" of a terrorist group. 75 For an analyst making a probabilistic assessment, an event tree thus presents a problem: in order to assess the behaviour of the group at each step it is currently necessary to take account of the entire decision-making process of the group, including scenario-specific tactical choices and broader strategic intentions. However, the insights into the entire decision-making process of nuclear terrorist groups are precisely the desired outputs of the modelling efforts themselves.
For example, to assess the probability of a terrorist group successfully procuring fissile material through a specified channel it is necessary to understand the group's overall strategy regarding their planned act of nuclear terror. Given the significant resources that must be accorded to a nuclear terrorist endeavour, any group engaging in such activity may well formulate a clear (albeit malleable) plan of action, taking into account their own capabilities, the barriers they will face, their strategic aims, and their own perceptions regarding success or failure. This analysis, fully synthesised, will form a basis for the plan of action a group will likely adopt which will guide subsequent behaviour. This leads to the aforementioned logical inconsistency in the application of event tree models: in order to determine the probability of, say, a terrorist group attempting to acquire fissile material through the black market, it is necessary to understand the group's broader strategy pertaining to acts of nuclear terror, which
itself is exactly what the model attempts to determine. As the US National Research
Council study makes clear, " [f] or decision problems as complex as those motivating [this study], the assessment of the probabilities that adversaries will choose courses of action should be the outputs of analysis, not required input parameters."
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Event trees overly simplify nuclear terrorism
Event tree models are overly prescriptive in structural terms to the point at which their use militates against a realistic representation of terrorist behaviour. Between the initiator-terminus extremes, events are laid out in a linear chain with a prescribed and non-negotiable ordering. This rigidity goes against the evidence available in both the nuclear terror domain and in broader discussions of highly engineered systems 76 Ibid.
designed and produced by illicit groups. That terrorists will undertake a clear, linear chain of actions to achieve their goals is an a priori assumption that is not compatible with available albeit limited evidence. 77 This does not mean that terrorist groups operate without a clear overarching strategy. Rather, it suggests that strategic aims can be fulfilled in a nonlinear way, and that the best-laid plans often go awry.
In the application of event-trees, the characteristics of terrorist groups that would pursue nuclear terrorism are considered to be generic. This is an unrealistic state support. 80 These two groups and others willing to engage in nuclear terrorism differ significantly in terms of their aims, motivations, structures, financial arrangements, and openness to external influence, and so warrant a distinct assessment taking these differences into account.
This situation obtains in numerous quantitative studies of nuclear terrorism. For instance, in one survey-based study, 75% of respondents reported the black market route as the most likely pathway for terrorist acquisition of nuclear material.
81
However, this judgement of terrorist group behaviour is conditional upon a wide range of group-and scenario-specific assumptions and factors, none of which are made explicit in the analysis, which thus renders the figure meaningless as a descriptor of terrorist behaviour.
Risk models and nuclear terrorism: a new perspective
The preceding sections outline the difficulties associated with numerical risk assessments of nuclear terrorism. Efforts to date are centred on overly simplistic models which fail to take account of terrorist intelligence and adaptation in response to measures designed to mitigate the risks of terrorism, and offer wildly divergent predictions. In operation, model input requirements demand analysts to make judgements of terrorist behaviour that, themselves, should be the output of welldefined modelling processes. However, by adopting an alternative perspective on the utility of risk modelling it is possible to obtain useful insights relating to nuclear terrorism.
Conventional wisdom suggests that modelling has two purposes, to explain or predict some portion of the real world. 82 Probabilistic risk models are predictive in that they attempt to anticipate future events. Those negative events considered most likely to occur become the focus for measures designed either to diminish the likelihood of occurrence or to mitigate negative consequences. This has been the case to date when modelling nuclear terrorism, with emphasis placed on determining probabilities for the purpose of policy formation. The crucial obstacle here is that nuclear terrorism is a virtual risk and, therefore, attempts to apply subjective Bayesian probabilistic estimates are subject to a large knowledge gap. However, models can perform a far wider range of roles beyond these two basic functions. connected function, to structure thinking and to provide a locus for discussion amongst relevant stakeholders.
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Models to structure thinking
Models offer a formal environment to structure thinking. In the context of nuclear terrorism, they allow analysts to make a range of simplifying assumptions such that important characteristics of terrorist behaviour become amenable to investigation. By codifying these steps mathematically a formal model can "make explicit the assumptions about the key factors affecting the risk", offering the analyst a framework in which to operate. 85 The model is "itself the starting point for future discussion and hence shapes those discussions," acting as a medium through which analysis can occur. 86 As Pate-Cornell observes in the context of nuclear terrorism: "Because we illustrate our model using fictitious numbers, the importance of this work is not so much in the specific ranking of countermeasures that it suggests as in the framework for reasoning that it provides." 87 As the 'numbers' inputted into any model of nuclear terrorism will be 'fictitious' in the sense that nuclear terrorism is a virtual risk, this is a positive way of utilising models developed to date.
For example, Bunn's model has been highly influential in this respect. By adopting a supply-chain perspective of nuclear terrorism, with the attendant breakdown of terrorist decision-making into a linear chain, the model focuses the analyst's attention on the different options open to terrorist groups. These are explicitly linked to policy options that may decrease the likelihood of acquisition of nuclear weapons or fissile material. The power of this approach is that "by breaking a large, and at first glance, intractable question into a series of smaller individual questions, an estimate can be obtained for the overall question." 88 This is a significant contribution to the debate, which both emphasises the importance of policy-relevant contributions and legitimises investigation into this contentious subject. This is, of course, subject to the proviso that model outputs are not treated as inviolable and that analysts utilising such methods acknowledge this essential truism.
Risk models as loci of discussion
Modelling can catalyse stakeholder community engagement with a topic of investigation in a shared manner, with models "focusing debate and highlighting the 
How to use risk models
Accepting the notion that models can act as a structured locus for discussion, it is natural to ask precisely how to use a model in this way. Fortunately, established methods already exist -when assessing the risk of events with low occurrence rates or for which adequate data is unavailable recourse to expert opinion for probabilistic estimation is a well-studied activity. analysts are required to input probabilities that themselves should be the output of modelling efforts into event tree models.
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Finally, it is important to stress that the above discussion should be caveated by the intrinsic challenges in formalising a process as complex as nuclear terrorism. Capturing this within any kind of mathematical model may serve to shape the resultant discussion in a way that obscures features of fundamental importance. Even when less emphasis is placed on the numbers themselves, the very act of modelling serves to constrain the way analysts can approach complex issues. As Martha Lampland has argued, the utility of processes whereby false or provisional numbers are produced is highly context dependent. 98 The efficacy of such processes will also evolve over time.
Consequently, probabilistic modelling should be viewed as one tool amongst many available to analysts -and is not something that should be used to the exclusion of other quantitative or qualitative approaches.
Conclusion
Risk estimation in the area of nuclear terrorism is an extremely challenging task. means of benchmarking nuclear security efforts, great care must be taken in their production. Here is it important that analysts understand the strengths and weaknesses of the models that they employ and caveat their conclusions accordingly.
However, to date the majority of studies have over-reached and under-caveated their conclusions, through employing inappropriate models and using data that is far from representative of nuclear terrorism. This paper has attempted to demonstrate, through outlining different approaches to probability estimation, that nuclear terrorism should be considered as a virtual risk which escapes simple quantification.
That does not mean, however, that models cannot be used, but instead that their ultimate purpose must be reconsidered. Models of nuclear terrorism can be used to structure thinking and to serve as loci of discussion, highlighting areas of disagreement and, hence, serving to direct future research efforts. When employing them to this end, use should be made of expert groups over individuals and models should look to incorporate feedback and response mechanisms. It should also be recognised that the development of unifying models for the nuclear terrorism phenomenon as a whole is unrealistic. Instead individual models should be constructed and applied to different components as appropriate. This nuanced understanding is necessary to ensure the questionable results of modelling efforts in the nuclear terrorism domain are not oversold to the policy-making community. 
